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The global economic crisis of 2008-09 was transmit-
ted, with one exception, to the Caucasus, Central 
Asia and Mongolia through declines in prices for their 
commodity exports and a slowdown in destination 
countries—principally the Russian Federation--which 
buy their exports and employ migrant workers, with 
one exception.  Unlike the other countries, however, 
Kazakhstan, which is well-integrated into global financial 
markets, experienced a sudden stop in capital flows in 
2007.  Fiscal stimulus has supported weakening econo-
mies, and has been financed through official borrowing 
in energy importers (Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan) to the extent pre-crisis 
imbalances and the resulting debt dynamics allow and 
by stabilization funds in energy exporters (Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan).  But more 
concessional financing will be needed to moderate the 
tradeoff between stimulus and sustainable debt levels 
in the event of a weaker than expected global recovery.  
Distress in banking sectors has been contained through 
liquidity support and deposit guarantees but regulatory 
forbearance should be avoided and proactive bank 
restructuring undertaken so as not to impede financial 
intermediation and economic recovery.  Means-tested 
safety net programs, which can be scaled up to cushion 
the poorest households from the effects of the crisis, 
are in general better developed in the Caucasus than 
in Central Asia and Mongolia, where significant reform 
within existing fiscal envelopes and, in some cases, 
introduction of new programs are called for.  Structural 
reforms to stay competitive in a post-crisis environment, 
where capital flows to developing countries are likely 
to be lower, should prioritize infrastructure and labor 
skills, which have emerged as the tightest bottlenecks to 
growth. 1
1  The author is a former Chief Economist, Europe and Central Asia at the 
World Bank. Paper prepared for the Centennial Group, Washington DC.  I thank Elena 
Kantarovich for excellent research assistance.
I.   Introduction
The global economic and financial crisis of 2008-09 
did not affect most countries in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia and Mongolia directly2.   Its epicenter was 
in advanced country financial markets with which, with 
the exception of Kazakhstan, the other countries were 
not well integrated.  The crisis however led to deleverag-
ing from financially integrated transition and developing 
countries among which the Russian Federation, in 
the neighborhood of the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
was for them the most important.  The financial crisis 
also precipitated a worldwide recession.  The ways in 
which its effects were transmitted to the Caucasus, 
Central Asia and Mongolia include terms of trade losses 
for commodity exporters (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Mongolia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), a slowdown 
in the growth of export demand as a result of the global 
economic downturn (all countries), a fall in remittances 
due mainly to the downturn in the Russian Federation 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and, for countries integrated 
into global financial markets, a “capital account crisis” 
marked by a sudden stop in and a potential reversal of 
external capital flows, of which Kazakhstan was an early 
casualty.  
This paper discusses how the Caucasus, Central 
Asia and Mongolia have been affected by the crisis and 
what the first round of responses to it has been. The 
countries of focus are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which vary greatly in 
their level of per capita income, degree of economic 
integration and, therefore, the extent to which they 
have been affected by the crisis.  Estimates of gross 
national income per capita in 2008 at market exchange 
rates put the Kyrgyz Republic ($740), Tajikistan ($600) 
and Uzbekistan ($910) in the low income and Mongolia 
($1680), Georgia ($2,470), Turkmenistan ($2,840), 
2  The Caucasus include Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, while Central Asia 
includes Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
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Armenia ($3,350), Azerbaijan ($3,830) and Kazakhstan 
($6,140) in the lower middle-income group of countries.
Section II of the paper presents aspects of the inte-
gration of the Caucasus, Central Asia and Mongolia in 
the world economy to provide the context for how they 
were affected by a crisis which originated in advanced 
country financial markets.  Section III examines pre-crisis 
economic developments till 2008.  Sections IV, V and 
VI cover recession, recovery and reform respectively. 
Section VII summarizes some conclusions that can be 
drawn from this experience and is followed in Section 
VIII by notes on the impact of the crisis and the policy 
response in each country.  
II.  Aspects of Integration
Trade
Trade openness—measured as the sum of exports 
and imports as a share of GDP (in purchasing power 
parity)—rose sharply from around 2003 to a range of 
between nearly 50 and 60 percent, reflecting, inter alia, 
the rapid rise in oil prices in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan (Figure 1).  The corresponding figure 
for Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan ranged between 
30 to 35 percent, which is broadly comparable to that 
for developing East Asia, going down to 20 percent for 
Uzbekistan.  An examination of the factor composition 
of exports reveals that the share of natural resource-
intensive products in exports in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Mongolia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan is nearly 90 
percent or more, while that of natural resource-intensive 
and unskilled labor-intensive products in exports in 
the Kyrgyz Republic is over 90 percent.,  Somewhat in 
contrast, skilled labor-intensive and capital-intensive 
products account for 30 percent of Uzbekistan’s exports 
and nearly a quarter of Georgia’s exports (Figure 2).  The 
dominance of natural resource-intensive products is 
owed to the massive deindustrialization that occurred 
after the break up of the former Soviet Union, which 
led to an increase the share of ores, metals and fuels 





















































































in exports at the expense of manufacturing.  Trade 
in energy and raw materials experienced a boost in 
resource-rich countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan. Tajikistan’s exports are dominated by 
aluminum, while the Kyrgyz Republic’s rely extensively 
on gold.
Finance
Financial openness—the sum of foreign assets and 
foreign liabilities as a share of GDP—is the highest in 
Kazakhstan, reaching over 60 percent in 2007 and 
falling to 50 percent in 2008—a number comparable to 
that for the new member states of the European Union.  
The corresponding figure for Armenia and Azerbaijan 
is 10 percent, with Georgia occupying an intermediate 
position (Figure 3).  Furthermore, the nature of financial 
integration varies greatly across the countries.  Over 90 
percent and over 70 percent of banking sector assets 
in Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic respectively and 
around 50 percent of banking sector assets in Armenia 
are foreign-owned.  In contrast, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Mongolia and Tajikistan have majority domestic-owned 
banking sectors, with the extent of foreign ownership 
being 40 percent in Kazakhstan and Mongolia and in the 
single digits in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan.  Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan have banking sectors that are predomi-
nantly state-owned3. 
The reason for the relative unimportance of the finan-
cial sector as a channel of transmission for the crisis is 
not hard to find.  Although financial systems have come 
a long way since the start of the transition from plan to 
market, they are smaller than that predicted by GDP per 
capita (Figure 4).  This is true for lower middle income 
countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, 
although not Kazakhstan, where extraordinarily rapid 
credit growth had led to “normal” financial depth by 
2007.  Indeed, with the exception of Kazakhstan, liquidity 
and efficiency of financial markets in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia are lower than in countries at similar per 
3  EBRD (2009).
Source: UN COMTRADE, SITC rev. 1























































































Source: Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2009
 Private credit to GDP versus GDP per capita



















































































capita income levels4.   This is the result of bank restruc-
turing in those countries having been postponed for the 
most part to the second decade of transition.  However, 
financial shallowness also limited the costs imposed by 
financial distress triggered by the global crisis on the rest 
of the economy.
III.  Economic Developments till 2008
Armenia, Georgia, Mongolia, Tajikistan and, until 2007, 
Kazakhstan enjoyed substantial capital flows on a scale 
higher than in developing East Asia and Latin America, 
while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were not reliant on 
them.  Azerbaijan became a net capital exporter after 
2005 (Figure 5).  Countries grew robustly during much 
4  Liquidity is measured by the liquid liabilities of the financial system 
(currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of bank and nonbank financial 
intermediaries) divided by GDP. Efficiency is measured by net interest margin, (net interest 
revenue relative to total earning assets averaged over all banks for each country) and by  
overhead costs (total operating costs relative to total assets averaged over all available 
data).  For details see Mitra, Selowsky and Zalduendo (2009). It should be noted that 
references to “Caucasus and Central Asia” in the paper exclude Mongolia.
of the period—part of transition-based output recovery 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia—generally slowing in 
2008 as the effects of the global economic crisis began 
to take hold (Figure 6).  
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
grew at double-digit or near-double-digit rates, while 
there was an uptick in growth in Georgia, Mongolia and 
Uzbekistan after 2003-2004, which was a period of 
unusually high global liquidity.  There was some increase 
in inflation after 2005 in a majority of the countries under 
consideration, reaching double digits in Azerbaijan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and, after 2006 in the Kyrgyz 
Republic, a trend also seen in other developing economy 
regions (Figure 7). 
Growth was accompanied by an accumulation of 
current account imbalances after 2005 in Armenia, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan after 2005, with the 
sudden stop in capital flows to Kazakhstan bringing 
about a reversal in 2008 (Figure 8).  With the possible 
exception of Tajikistan, these could not be explained, by 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, World Bank, World Development Indicators and author’s calculations























































































Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, World Bank, World Development Indicators and author’s calculations



















































































Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, World Bank, World Development Indicators and author’s calculations
Current account balance (% of GDP)
Figure
8
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, World Bank, World Development Indicators and author’s calculations



















































































Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, World Bank, World Development Indicators and author’s calculations
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)
Figure
10
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, World Bank, World Development Indicators and author’s calculations



















































































terms of trade movements (Figure 9), nor, for the most 
part, by fiscal imbalances, despite their deterioration in 
Georgia and, to a lesser extent, Armenia. (Figure 10).  In 
fact, the worsening of external imbalances in Armenia, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan between 2003-05 
and 2006-08 was due for the most part to increasing 
private sector imbalances, with the qualification that in 
Tajikistan, higher public sector imbalances played an 
equally important role (Table 1).
As in other developing economy regions, external 
indebtedness was generally reduced since the turn 
of the century, particularly sharply in the cases of 
Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, signaling 
improved external solvency, but was to increase from 
Europe and Central Asia Region
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Kazakhstan Mongolia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan
2003-05
National Savings 22.4 32.1 16.3 27.0 30.4 20.0 - 31.3 24.2
Public 2.9 5.8 2.2 9.3 7.6 5.1 - 4.1 0.3
Private 19.6 26.3 14.1 17.7 22.8 14.9 - 27.2 23.9
National 
Investment 25.2 50.9 26.1 27.7 31.9 22.6 - 24.4 21.1
Public 4.2 4.6 2.8 4.9 4.5 7.5 - 3.7 -
Private 21.1 46.3 23.3 22.7 27.3 15.1 - 20.7 -
(S-I) public -1.3 1.2 -0.6 4.3 3.1 -2.4 - 0.4 -
(S-I) private -1.5 -20.0 -9.2 -5.0 -4.6 -0.2 - 6.5 -
Current Account -2.8 -18.8 -9.7 -0.6 -1.5 -2.6 2.8 6.9 3.7
Total Capital Flows 2.8 21.5 10.0 7.1 0.8 10.5 0.5 -1.3 1.8
∆ FX reserves 0.0 2.8 0.3 6.5 -0.7 8.0 3.3 5.6 5.5
(‘+ increase)
2006-08
National Savings 31.6 51.2 5.2 30.8 38.4 24.5 - 32.1 18.5
Public 2.1 19.0 4.1 10.1 11.7 8.9 - 3.5 3.6
Private 29.5 32.2 1.0 20.7 26.7 15.6 - 28.6 14.9
National 
Investment 38.2 23.9 24.6 32.5 38.4 31.0 - 22.4 21.7
Public 4.1 8.7 3.4 5.7 8.4 12.1 - 2.2 4.4
Private 34.1 15.2 21.2 26.8 30.0 18.8 - 20.2 17
(S-I) public -2.0 10.4 0.7 4.4 3.3 -3.2 - 1.3 -0.8
(S-I) private -4.6 17.0 -20.2 -6.1 -3.3 -3.2 - 8.4 -2.5
Current Account -6.6 27.3 -19.4 -1.7 0.1 -6.4 16.7 9.7 -3.3
Total Capital Flows 8.8 -20.2 21.2 9.6 6-1 10.2 1.2 -1.4 9.8
∆ FX reserves 2.2 7.1 1.8 7.9 6-2 3.8 17.9 8.3 6.5
(‘+ increase)
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, IMF country reports, World Bank World Development Indicators and author’s calculationss
Savings - Investment Balance (% of GDP)


















































































Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, World Bank, World Development Indicators and author’s calculations
Short-Term Debt to Foreign Exchange Reserves
Figure
12
Note: 1 no separate legal tender; 2 is a currency board; 3 conventional pegged arrangement; 3.5 conventional peg to a basket; 4 pegged exchange 
rate within horizontal bands; 5 equals crawling peg; 6 equals crawling band; 7 equals managed floating with no predetermined path; and 8 equals 
independently floating.
Source: IMF’s AREAER, Bubula and Otker-Robe, and author’s calculations



















































































2005 in Kazakhstan and towards the end of the period 
in Georgia (Figure 11).  The ratio of maturing short-term 
debt to foreign exchange reserves—a measure of exter-
nal liquidity—was well below one, with the exception 
of Georgia and Kazakhstan (Figure 12).  The picture on 
external solvency and liquidity is rounded out by looking 
at countries’ choice of exchange rate regimes (Figure 
13).
There was a notable increase in private sector credit-
to-GDP ratios in all countries, particularly since 2005, 
with some scaling back in Kazakhstan after the sudden 
stop in external capital flows (Figure 14).  However, given 
the comparative shallowness of the financial sector, part 
of the increase is attributable to financial deepening in 
countries that lacked financial sectors at the beginning 
of the transition.  The annual growth of real credit to the 
private sector was 49 percent in Georgia, 36 percent 
in Kazakhstan, 42 percent in Armenia and 39 percent 
in Azerbaijan during 2005—08.  Financial depth was 
much lower in Armenia and Georgia in 2004 compared 
to Kazakhstan.  Hence even with extremely high growth 
of real private sector credit during 2005—08, their 
financial sectors by the end of the period were smaller 
than what would be expected on the basis of their 
incomes per capita (Figure 4).  The same is a fortiori true 
of Azerbaijan, which is richer than Armenia and Georgia, 
but has a financial depth similar to those two countries.  
The share of households in bank loans to households 
and nonfinancial corporates rose very sharply from 12 
percent in 2003 to 30 percent in 2008 in Kazakhstan—
an increase comparable to that seen in Russia and 
a correlate of financial deepening.  And although 
comparable data are available for only four countries, 
private sector credit expansion was also accompanied 
by loan growth in excess of growth in deposits, leading 
to an increase in the loan-to-deposit ratio which came to 
exceed unity in all countries, but was nearly 2 in Georgia 
and Kazakhstan, making banks in those countries 
particularly vulnerable to reversals in market sentiment 
(Figure 15).  The implication of a loan-to-deposit ratio 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, World Bank, World Development Indicators and author’s calculations




















































































Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, World Bank, World Development Indicators and author’s calculations
Loan to Deposit Ratio
Figure
15
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, World Bank, World Development Indicators and 
author’s calculations
Foreign Exchange Assets to Liabilities
Figure   
16A
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, World Bank, World Development Indicators and 
author’s calculations
Liabilities to Equity Ratio


















































































greater than one is that credit expansion was financed, 
depending on the country concerned, by parent bank 
or wholesale funding, generally a riskier strategy than 
relying wholly on domestic deposits.  Foreign liabilities 
of banks generally increased, with the exception of 
Kazakhstan (Figure 16a). Leverage ratios (liabilities-to-
equity) increased in Azerbaijan and Georgia and till 2006 
in Kazakhstan but are lower for example than in East 
Asia in the 1990s (Figure 16b).
IV.  Recession
Channels of transmission
First, the sharp contraction in GDP in 2009 in the 
Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine, estimated at 
7.5 percent, 6.5 percent and 14 percent respectively, 
has depressed export demand in all the countries of the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, for whom they are the major 
export markets5. 
Second, a fall in oil prices from nearly $150/bbl to 
nearly $40/bbl during the second half of 2008, affected 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan adversely, 
while benefiting the oil importing countries in the region.  
At the same time, Mongolia suffered a shock due to a 
vertiginous drop in copper prices between the middle of 
2008 and January 2009.
Third, a fall in remittances, preliminarily estimated 
at between one-third and one-half, affected Tajikistan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Georgia 
and Azerbaijan, where remittances as a share of GDP 
in 2008 were 47 percent, 25 percent, 18 percent, 7 
percent, 6 percent and 3 percent respectively.  Over 
90 percent of remittances in the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan, three-quarters in Armenia and somewhat over 
half of those to Azerbaijan and Georgia originate in the 
Russian Federation.
Finally, Kazakhstan, which among all the countries 
under consideration, has a financial sector that is most 
integrated into global financial markets experienced a 
5  China, where GDP growth slowed in 2008 to 9 percent, but not significantly 
in 2009, is by far the dominant market for Mongolia’s exports.
sudden stop in capital flows in August 2007.
In addition, the capital account crisis in the Russian 
Federation, had knock on effects: first, the adverse 
effects of a sizeable ruble devaluation on external 
competitiveness in countries with important trading 
links with the Russian Federation and second, on the 
financing side, a decline in Russian foreign direct invest-
ment.  Evidently countries were hit by more than one 
transmission channel.  Furthermore, the same transmis-
sion channel, for example, global deleveraging by banks, 
with its attendant consequences, while it most affected 
Kazakhstan, was felt in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
as well, but to a considerably lesser extent because 
their banking sectors, though developing rapidly, are 
comparatively smaller.
The role of transition
The reason countries were hit by similar shocks but to 
differing degrees with regard to both trade and finance 
owes something to the history of transition.  
The reintegration into world trade since the disinte-
gration of trading blocs at the beginning of the transition 
has led to the countries of Caucasus and Central Asia 
trading less with the large middle income countries of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, viz., Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine (the middle income 
CIS) than at the beginning of the transition, although 
the middle income CIS continues to be their major trad-
ing partner6.   However, this group of countries trades 
below its potential and trades too little with the rest of 
the world7.   While a geographically more diversified pat-
tern of trade would not have prevented a trade-induced 
recession in the context of a coordinated worldwide 
downturn, continued diversification would lessen vulner-
ability to more localized episodes in the future.
On finance, the proximate reason for the degree 
of capital account crisis depending on the size and 
6  For the purposes of this and the following sentence, “Caucasus and Central 
Asia” excludes Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
7  Potential trade is that predicted by a gravity model where trade between 
any two countries depends on their populations, geographic distance between their 



















































































integration of the financial sector was the extraordinary 
growth of private sector credit made possible by large 
external flows intermediated by banks.  The annual 
growth rates of real private sector credit during 2000—
2004 and 2005—2008 were respectively 2 percent and 
42 percent in Armenia, 24 percent and 39 percent in 
Azerbaijan, 14 percent and 49 percent in Georgia and 
43 percent and 36 percent in Kazakhstan.  With the 
exception of Kazakhstan where growth in the second 
period was lower than in the first, these growth rates 
were in excess of those in all developing countries dur-
ing this period, even allowing for initially shallow financial 
sectors8.   This was a process of catch up by countries 
which had experienced deep and protracted transition 
recessions following the break up of the former Soviet 
Union.  In Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, for example, the 
credit boom was driven by households.  It was facilitated 
by their ability to borrow in foreign currency, which 
typically had lower interest rates and longer maturities 
than those in local currency.  And, on the supply side, 
2003—2006 was a period of historically high global 
liquidity, with fierce competition in international banking 
and abundant supplies of credit to emerging market 
economies.  This combination of demand and supply 
incentives allowed loan-to-deposit ratios to become 
substantially greater than one, implying that external 
financing made up the difference between the credit 
extended by banks and what they were taking in from 
depositors (Figure 14).  The continuing long-term proc-
ess of financial deepening implies that more of the coun-
tries under consideration might have experienced capital 
account crises had the global financial crisis erupted 
later than it did.
V.  Recovery
Adjustment vs. financing 
Terms of trade losses, slower growing or declining 
exports and sharply falling remittances in a recessionary 
8  Details of the comparison with developing countries and the definition of 
what constitutes excessive credit growth are developed in Mitra, Selowsky and Zalduendo 
(2009).
environment have led most countries to pursue expan-
sionary fiscal policies to support weakening economies, 
while seeking external financing to finance a larger fiscal 
deficit.  Sharp reductions in tax revenue that typically 
occurred due to collapsing imports, declining asset 
prices and weakening demand generally did not elicit 
corresponding cuts in expenditure.  This is the profile of 
adjustment, for example, in Armenia, Georgia, Mongolia 
and Tajikistan where, notwithstanding increases in fiscal 
deficits in 2009, automatic stabilizers were not allowed 
to operate fully.  This was because fiscal policy had 
been strongly pro-cyclical in Mongolia prior to the crisis 
and the requisite finance was unavailable, whereas in 
Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan, the additional financing 
required to have done so risked building unsustainable 
debt dynamics in varying degrees.  A partial exception 
is provided by the Kyrgyz Republic, where the availability 
of large concessional donor support makes the tradeoff 
between fiscal easing and debt sustainability less acute. 
Fiscal accommodation was appropriate, because it may 
have been the only policy instrument available to provide 
stimulus.  This is because monetary policy was ineffec-
tive in reducing lending rates in countries where banking 
sectors are small, risk-averse banks prefer to stay liquid 
as asset quality deteriorates in a slowing economy, there 
is a degree of deposit dollarization as high as between 
a half and three-quarters and demand for credit was, in 
any event, falling during the recession.  
All five countries allowed major depreciation of their 
currencies.  Faced with a significant ruble deprecia-
tion in the Russian Federation owing to that country’s 
capital account crisis, Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz 
Republic and Tajikistan did so, not only to avoid becom-
ing uncompetitive but also to reduce uncertainty and 
discourage further deposit dollarization.  Mongolia 
attempted to maintain its dollar peg initially but unsuc-
cessfully and the currency was then allowed to depreci-
ate substantially.  In all cases, a weaker currency had 
adverse effects on unhedged borrowers and, given high 
loan dollarization in a number of countries, potentially 

















































































The tradeoff between supporting demand in a reces-
sionary environment and maintaining sustainable debt 
levels has been addressed by allowing fiscal accommo-
dation in 2009, while preparing for fiscal consolidation 
to begin in 2010 and continue into the future.  The IMF 
projects that the public debt to GDP ratio will reach a 
peak of around 47 percent in 2011 in both Armenia and 
Georgia and decline thereafter, which represents a man-
ageable debt dynamics.  But this strategy could become 
more complicated were the recovery to be weak and 
protracted.  More concessional lending would alleviate 
the tradeoff between prolonged support to the economy 
and maintaining debt at sustainable levels in Armenia 
and Georgia.  While Tajikistan is judged to be at high risk 
of debt distress, the debt remains at sustainable levels 
provided the external debt ceiling of 40 percent, which 
includes concessional lending, is respected.  Tajikistan 
would benefit from grant financing.
The time phasing of adjustment and financing has 
been accompanied by expenditure reallocation as well.  
Armenia has protected social spending, strengthened 
social safety nets and increased capital spending on 
foreign-financed projects, Georgia has reallocated 
resources to social and capital spending from defense 
spending, while Tajikistan has reallocated them to pro-
tect social spending and ease infrastructure bottlenecks.
Adverse terms of trade movements, slower growing 
or declining exports and falling remittances affected 
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan as well and raise similar 
issues for economic policy.  However, instead of resort-
ing to external finance, those countries, having entered 
the crisis with strong fiscal and foreign exchange posi-
tions, were able to use their stabilization funds to sup-
port accommodative fiscal policy.  Furthermore, faced 
with ruble depreciation and those of other currencies in 
the region, Uzbekistan allowed a major depreciation of 
the currency in 2009.  After a brief spell of pegging to a 
two-currency basket, Azerbaijan continues to maintain 
its dollar peg at the pre-crisis level.  
A capital account crisis… 
Kazakhstan experienced three sets of external shocks: 
first, a sudden stop in wholesale external funding in 
August 2007, precipitating a capital accounts crisis, and, 
in common with other countries in the region, second, a 
slowdown in the growth of export demand in 2008; and 
third, a collapse in its external terms of trade as oil prices 
fell rapidly in the second half of 2008.  A capital account 
crisis, which is marked by an abrupt stop in and typically 
a reversal in capital flows, carries the potential of a loss 
of confidence.  Creditors head for the exits.  The cur-
rency comes under intense pressure.  And the banking 
system experiences distress, both on the liability side as 
wholesale and interbank funding dry up and, in some 
cases, the deposit base erodes, as well as on the asset 
side as borrowers face financial difficulties.  The latter 
are manifested in a rising share of non-performing loans 
in total loans which, in the capital account crises in East 
Asia in 1997-98 for example, peaked at 32 percent in 
Indonesia, 35 percent in Korea, 30 percent in Malaysia 
and 23 percent in Thailand.  
As capital flows reversed, the central bank used 25 
percent of reserves to defend the currency both to main-
tain depositor confidence and to limit risks to corporate 
balance sheets.  It was only after the fall in oil prices 
in 2008 and the ruble depreciation that the tenge was 
devalued in February 2009.  Banks in Kazakhstan owed 
nearly 40 percent of GDP in external liabilities, a quarter 
of which matured in 2009.  Two of the four major banks 
stopped making payments on principal. 
…and the financial sector
Restoring the financial system to health was important 
because both consumption and investment depend on 
credit.  Policy responses to systemic banking crises typi-
cally distinguish between a containment phase (primarily 
related to the liability side of banks’ balance sheets) 
where the priority is to restore confidence by depositors 
and investors in the banking system and a resolution 
phase (primarily related to the asset side of banks’ bal-


















































































banks and their borrowers.  The central bank attempted 
to contain the banking crisis by providing liquidity sup-
port through a variety of means and increased the limit 
up to which retail deposits were guaranteed.  The provi-
sion of liquidity support and deposit guarantees needs 
to be accompanied by intervention in banks deemed 
insolvent.  In Kazakhstan, the regulators took over the 
largest bank under their enhanced powers of bank 
resolution.  
Asset quality in the banking system is deteriorat-
ing, as seen in the rising share of nonperforming loans 
and loan loss provisions in Kazakhstan.  The resolution 
phase requires a triage of banks into those that are 
viable and meet regulatory requirements, those that are 
viable but undercapitalized, and those that are nonviable 
and insolvent.  Solvent and undercapitalized banks need 
to be capitalized on a timetable agreed with regula-
tors.  Unless market players are prepared to absorb the 
assets of fragile banks prior to bankruptcy, nonviable 
and insolvent banks need to be taken over by regulators 
and a decision taken on their future.  In Kazakhstan, the 
sovereign wealth fund entrusted with crisis response 
injected capital into the top three banks and took a con-
trolling share in the largest of them.  Agreement involving 
burden-sharing with creditors was also recently reached 
on the restructuring of the two large banks that had 
been in default9. 
Other countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia 
and Mongolia did not experience a capital account 
crisis.  But inasmuch as banks in some countries were 
borrowing abroad and have been affected by the dry-
ing up of external wholesale funding since the global 
financial crisis intensified in September 2008, they have 
been required to take the kind of policy measures to 
address the liability side that had been adopted a year 
earlier in Kazakhstan.  And the deterioration of asset 
quality brought about by the global crisis is reflected 
in rising nonperforming loans in all countries and has 
called for policies appropriate for the resolution phase 
of banking crises.  Indeed all countries have made sure 
9  This is pending the approval of all the creditors in one case.
that the supervisory authorities have necessary powers 
of intervention.  
It is important in all these cases however that the 
authorities avoid regulatory forbearance to prevent the 
emergence of zombie banks.  Bank restructuring should 
be accompanied by processes to catalyze debt work-
outs between banks and their corporate and household 
borrowers, so that problem loans do not impede finan-
cial intermediation and the recovery in what is expected 
to be a global environment of weak economic growth.
There is also an agenda of improving bank regulation 
and supervision in countries whose financial sectors 
have been affected by the crisis.  Higher overall ratios of 
capital to risk-weighted assets—larger than the minimum 
8 percent under Basel I and Basel II—are desirable for 
financial institutions in countries that face volatile capital 
movements, such as Kazakhstan and other lower middle 
income countries in the region with growing financial 
sectors that are integrating into the international financial 
markets.  This would provide a first line of defense to 
protect against operational and market risks and foreign 
currency loans, all of which are important in countries 
that are integrating financially—even though it would err 
on the side of financial stability at the expense of some 
loss in financial intermediation.  Strengthening supervi-
sion of cross-border banks through better coordination 
between home and host supervisors is desirable, while 
recognizing that there incentives to keep the supervi-
sors apart when a bank is in distress.  Beyond crisis 
management, however, there is an extensive agenda 
for modernizing banking sector institutions.  The World 
Bank-IMF Financial Stability Assessment Programs 
(FSAPs) and the Reviews of Standards and Codes 
(ROSCs) provide numerous recommendations on how to 
improve bank supervision in the Caucasus, Central Asia 
and Mongolia10. 
10  The agenda for modernizing banking sector institutions is discussed in 

















































































Scaling up social safety nets
Poverty is on the rise throughout the region, including 
among erstwhile recipients of remittances and employ-
ees in booming construction sectors.  An example of 
the poverty-increasing effects of the crisis is provided 
by Armenia, where poverty has increased from 25.6 
percent in the second quarter of 2008 to 28.4 percent 
in the second quarter of 2009 and extreme poverty 
from 3.6 percent to 6.9 percent over the same period, 
using national poverty lines11.  This calls for social 
safety nets to be strengthened.  The countries in the 
Caucasus, which spend between 1—1.5 percent of GDP 
on social assistance, have at least one well-targeted 
program where a high proportion of benefits reaches 
the poorest quintile of households and that could be 
scaled up in response to the crisis.  The Family Benefit 
Program in Armenia and the Targeted Social Assistance 
Programs in Azerbaijan and Georgia deliver between 55 
and 60 percent of their benefits to the poorest quintile 
11  Hentschel (2009)
of households, a degree of targeting accuracy on par 
with that in OECD countries.  But their coverage—the 
share of the poorest quintile of households reached by 
these programs—ranges from less than 20 percent in 
Azerbaijan to nearly 40 percent in Armenia and could 
be increased by consolidating other “legacy” privileges.  
The generosity of means-tested programs—the ratio of 
the benefits transferred by the program to the beneficiar-
ies’ post-transfer consumption—is one-third in Armenia 
and nearly half in Georgia (Figure 17).
With the exception of the Kyrgyz Republic, means-
tested safety nets are less well-developed in Central 
Asia.  Around 70 percent of benefits of the Targeted 
Social Assistance Program (TSA) in Kazakhstan reach 
the poorest quintile of households, its coverage is 
around 5 percent and it transfers only 13 percent of 
the post-transfer consumption of beneficiaries.  Since 
Kazakhstan spends just over 1 percent of GDP on social 
assistance and since the TSA accounts for less than 2 
percent of total safety net transfers, the program could 
Note: The figure shows the targeting accuracy and coverage of means-tested safety net programs. The size of the bubbles is a measure of their generosity—the transfer received by households 
in the poorest quintile as a share of the post-transfer consumption of all beneficiary households in that quintile.
Source: Mitra, Selowsky and Zalduendo (2009) 
Means-Tested Safety Nets: Targeting Accuracy, Coverage, 




















































































be doubled by spending an additional 0.02 percent of 
GDP12.   The cost would be less if the expansion of the 
targeted program were to be accompanied by significant 
reforms of the overall safety net.  While Uzbekistan 
spends 2 percent of GDP on social assistance, around 
double the ratio in Azerbaijan, the targeting and cover-
age of its means-tested program leaves considerable 
room for improvement.  Tajikistan, which spends 
0.5 percent of GDP on social assistance, has yet to 
develop a means-tested program that has high target-
ing accuracy and reasonable coverage of the poorest 
households. It takes 12—18 months to develop basic 
targeting, registry and safety net systems—consonant 
with the expected length of the downturn—but consid-
erably longer for lower income countries with weaker 
institutional capabilities.
The Kyrgyz Republic, which spends around 1 
percent of GDP on social assistance, transfers nearly 
12  This calculation does not incorporate administrative costs which may be 
higher for targeted programs.
60 percent of that amount through the Unified Monthly 
Benefit which, at 50 percent, has a targeting accuracy 
only slightly lower than its counterparts in the Caucasus.  
The coverage of households in the poorest quintile is 
however 30 percent and could be increased using the 
opportunity of the crisis by implementing policies similar 
to those recommended above.
Finally, Mongolia has taken the opportunity of the 
crisis to undertake a comprehensive reform of social 
transfers, including consolidation of the number of ben-
efits, a reduction in untargeted universal transfers and 
the introduction of a new benefit for those in poverty. 
VI.  Reform 
Reform and immediate recovery have so far dominated 
the policy agenda, but, to remain competitive in a 
post-crisis world, countries now need to reinvigorate 
structural reforms in areas that constitute the tightest 
Source: Mitra, Selowsky and Zalduendo (2009) 
Average Business Environment Constraint: Transition Economies in 



















































































bottlenecks to growth.  Despite an uncertain future, it is 
likely that private capital flows will be considerably lower 
and that both private and official flows will go to coun-
tries with the most attractive business environments.  
On the eve of the crisis, firm managers in an enter-
prise survey conducted in the transition economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
reported that among all the elements of their business 
environment, infrastructure and labor skills were the 
most constraining in terms of their ability to operate and 
expand their businesses.  It is also remarkable that these 
elements, which are part of the positive legacy of social-
ism, are also more constraining than in non-transition 
economies at similar income levels13 14.   Other elements 
of the business environment include taxation, labor 
13  The analysis is based on the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted by the World Bank and the EBRD every three 
years since 1999.  The responses in 2008 (BEEPS 4) correspond to 10,000 firms in 28 
transition countries excluding Turkmenistan. They are contrasted against responses by 
51,000 firms in 74 non-transition countries under the World Bank’s Investment Climate 
Assessments.
14  A fuller account is presented in Mitra, Selowsky and Zalduendo (2009)
regulation, customs administration, licensing, the rule of 
law and finance.  
Figure 18 measures GDP per capita on the horizon-
tal axis.  The vertical axis measures how costly firms in a 
country report the impact of inadequacies in elements of 
the business environment on their ability to operate and 
expand their businesses.  The reading on the vertical 
axis is the average of firm responses for the country.
Two types of business indicators are considered.
•	 The first is the response to the question asking 
managers to evaluate the importance of each 
business environment constraint for the opera-
tion and the growth of the firm.  Answers are 
scored from 1 (minor) to 4 (very severe).  This 
is referred to as a measure of the “level” of the 
constraint and is shown along the vertical axis 
of Figure 18.
•	 The second is a relative measure of the “priority” 
of a constraint, where the priority for a respond-
ing firm is defined as a value above the average 
Source: Mitra, Selowsky and Zalduendo (2009) 




















































































of the firm’s answers for the six constraints 
common to BEEPS 4 and most of the decade’s 
surveys, viz., tax rates, tax administration, labor 
regulation, licenses, corruption and crime.
To compare countries, it is necessary to control for 
the fact that the samples of firms for different countries 
will vary by characteristic such as firm size, their sector, 
the nature of ownership, whether domestic or foreign.  
To make the results comparable, these differences are 
corrected for, and the results presented for a benchmark 
firm.  The benchmark firm is chosen to be a firm in man-
ufacturing employing 30 persons, privately owned with 
no state-owned predecessor, with less than 10 percent 
foreign ownership, exporting less than 10 percent of its 
sales, and with no reported change in employment in 
the previous three years.  The ratings for the benchmark 
firm are referred to as conditional means because they 
are corrected for sample composition.  
Figure 18 presents conditional means for the level 
measure of the business environment for transition 
economies (TEs) for the 4 rounds of BEEPS from 1999 
through 2008 and for the averages over 2000—2008 for 
non-transition economies (NTEs).  It shows that, while 
the business environment in 2008 is on average more 
difficult for the TEs compare to the NTEs—a higher 
line for TEs in 2008 than NTEs---it is relatively more 
difficult for the lower and lower middle income TEs, 
which include Caucasus and Central Asia excluding 
Turkmenistan, compared to NTEs at similar income 
levels.
Furthermore, the survey evidence highlights emerg-
ing shortfalls of investment in physical infrastructure, 
especially in the upper and upper middle income transi-
tion countries and in education, especially in the low-
income and lower middle-income transition countries.  
Figure 19 presents the conditional means for the priority 
measure of the infrastructure constraint.  It shows that 
while infrastructure constraints became tighter for TEs 
compared to NTEs in 2008, for the first time since the 




















































































transition began, the lower and lower middle income 
TEs  (which include the Caucasus and Central Asia) are 
relatively less constrained compared to NTEs at similar 
income levels than the upper middle income TEs15.   
Figure 20 shows that, while constraints on labor 
skills became tighter for TEs compared to NTEs in 2008, 
once again for the first time since the transition began, 
the lower and lower middle income TEs (which include 
the Caucasus and Central Asia) are relatively more con-
strained compared to NTEs at similar income levels than 
the upper middle income TEs.
Thus, while the recession has likely loosened the 
infrastructure and labor skills constraints in the transi-
tion economies, they can be expected to reemerge as 
binding constraints once economic growth takes hold, 
underscoring the urgent need for structural reform in 
15  However, when infrastructure is disaggregated into its constituent subsec-
tors and the surveys split into three groups by income, the tightness of the electricity 
constraint in the lower and lower middle income TEs is comparable to that in the NTEs, 
whereas in transport it remains lower.  But firms in Mongolia, where the survey was also 
run, report not being less constrained than other transition economies with regard to 
electricity.
those sectors.
Finally, strong economic growth prior to the crisis 
appears to have increased the cost of weak market 
economy institutions, especially the legal environment 
in the lower middle-income transition economies and 
corruption in the low and lower middle-income transition 
economies, reversing a trend of improvement in both 
elements of the business environment observed till 
2005.  But other institutions of the market economy—
such as tax administration and customs regulation, 
which traditionally ranked high among concerns in 
transition economies—show progress in 2008, where 
on both the levels and the priority measures their 
importance falls into line with non-transition economies 
at similar incomes (Figures 21 and 22).  The 2008 survey 
also records a fall in concern with customs regulations.  
Whereas convergence on this measure to the non-
transition norm had already taken place for the richer 
transition economies by 2005, it is recorded only in 2008 
for the lower and lower middle income groups.
Source: Mitra, Selowsky and Zalduendo (2009) 





















































































The effects of the global economic crisis, which have 
been felt for just over a year in most of the Caucasus, 
Central Asia and Mongolia, allows the following conclu-
sions to be drawn.
First, countries have been able to draw on external 
financing to postpone the fiscal adjustment which would 
have aggravated the recession had it been implemented 
in 2009.  The extent to which this has been done 
appears to have been constrained either by excessive 
pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy prior to the crisis or by 
the need to avoid unsustainable levels of debt rather 
than the availability of financing.  The energy import-
ing countries in the region without stabilization funds, 
viz., Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia 
and Tajikistan, have IMF-supported programs which 
have attracted financing from the multilateral develop-
ment banks such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank and bilateral donors.  However, a 
protracted weak recovery from the crisis, which is not 
unusual when households and firms in the advanced 
countries must repair their balance sheets, could com-
plicate this strategy and would call for additional conces-
sional financing. 
Second, while the full extent of banking sector 
distress may not be known as yet, countries have 
been active in dealing with both the containment and 
resolution phases of potential or actual banking crises.  
Experience from earlier crises highlights the need to 
avoid regulatory forbearance to prevent the emergence 
of zombie banks.  Although private indebtedness in 
Caucasus, Central Asia and Mongolia is not thought to 
be high except in sectors such as construction and real 
estate, bank restructuring should be accompanied by 
processes to catalyze debt workouts between banks 
and their corporate and, where relevant, household bor-
rowers, so that problem loans do not impede financial 
intermediation and the recovery in what is expected to 
be an environment of weak economic growth.
Source: Mitra, Selowsky and Zalduendo (2009) 



















































































Third, the experience of credit growth funded by 
borrowing from external wholesale markets was the 
result of (a) on the demand side, rapid catch up in living 
standards by countries that had experienced deep and 
protracted transition recessions, and (b) on the supply 
side, fierce competition in international banking and 
abundant supplies of credit to emerging market econo-
mies during a period of unusually high global liquidity.  
This resulted in loan-to-deposit ratios ballooning to well 
over one, making countries vulnerable to reversals in 
market sentiment, as was the case of Kazakhstan in 
2007.  The challenge for bank regulation and supervi-
sion, not only in Kazakhstan, but also in other countries 
in the region with developing financial sectors is to tie 
the growth of the banking system to that of domestic 
deposits.  Efforts should be made to develop markets 
in domestic debt but, given the shallowness of financial 
systems and the high degree of deposit dollarization, 
this will happen over the medium-to-long term. 
Fourth, well-targeted social safety nets should be 
scaled up in countries where they exist and the oppor-
tunity of the crisis should be taken to introduce poverty-
focused programs in countries where they do not, in 
order to deal with the human dimension of the crisis. 
Official financing can be used to support such spending.
Finally, infrastructure and labor skills, which have 
emerged as the tightest bottlenecks to growth, need 
urgent reform if countries are to stay competitive when 
the recovery from the crisis takes hold. 
VIII.  Country Notes
A.  Energy Importers/Labor Exporters
Armenia
The sharp downturn in the Russian Federation, 
which accounts for around three-quarters of remittances 
to Armenia, led to a fall in remittances—which had 
reached 18 percent of GDP in 2008—by an estimated 
30 percent year-on-year in the first half of 200916.  
16  In addition to workers’ remittances, employee compensation and migrants’ 
Armenia’s export earnings were also hit, not only by the 
Russian downturn, but a steep fall in copper prices dur-
ing the latter half of 2008 as well.  On the financing side, 
foreign direct investment in 2009 is estimated to have 
fallen by nearly two-thirds compared to 2008 levels.  
Construction, the growth of which had been fueled more 
by remittances than mortgage credit, and which had 
come to account for 30 percent of GDP in an economy 
where pre-crisis growth had been concentrated in a 
few sectors, contributed in large measure to the fall 
in GDP in 2009.  Indeed GDP is estimated to have 
contracted by over 15 percent in 2009, making Armenia 
the country hardest hit by the global economic crisis 
in the Caucasus and Central Asia.  The currency was 
allowed to depreciate by about 20 percent against the 
dollar in March 2009 in part to restore competitiveness 
in the aftermath of the ruble depreciation and to allay 
uncertainty that was contributing to deposit dollarization, 
which has since stabilized at around 65 percent.
The contraction in export earnings, remittances and 
FDI flows caused a squeeze in imports.  This contributed 
to a sharp fall in revenue since imports account for over 
two-thirds of revenue from the value added tax.  Faced 
with a weakening economy, the authors introduced a 
broad anti-crisis program, which included measures 
such as providing government guarantees to and taking 
equity positions in the private sector, interest rate subsi-
dies for mortgage loans, funding a pan-Armenian bank 
to finance large national investment projects, protecting 
social spending, strengthening targeted social safety 
nets and increasing capital spending on foreign-financed 
projects.  Primary spending has risen by 6 percentage 
points of GDP in 2009.  The fiscal deficit is estimated to 
be 7.5 percent in 2009.
Expansionary fiscal policy was made possible by 
financing from the IMF, World Bank and the AsDB as 
well as bilateral assistance from the Russian Federation.  
This has increased the public debt.  In order to keep the 
debt dynamics manageable, the looser fiscal stance of 
2009 will give way to fiscal consolidation in 2010, when 


















































































the economy is expected to be stronger, and the fiscal 
deficit is projected to fall to below 6 percent of GDP.  
This phasing of adjustment causes the public debt, 
which was less than 16 percent of GDP in 2008, to peak 
in 2011 at about 47 percent of GDP, before falling to 
under 40 percent of GDP in 2014.  While this is manage-
able, it would be rendered more difficult in the event of a 
weak rebound in growth, which depends greatly on the 
pace of recovery in the Russian Federation.  The avail-
ability of concessional lending would help ensure that 
debt levels remain sustainable.
The response to the crisis aims to protect social 
spending and strengthen targeted safety nets. Armenia 
spends around 1.75 percent of GDP on social assist-
ance.  Over 55 percent of this amount is devoted to the 
means-tested Family Benefit Program, which transfers 
nearly 60 percent of its benefits to the poorest quintile 
of households, covers 35 percent of them and accounts 
for one-third of the post-transfer consumption of ben-
eficiaries.  This provides a strong basis for expanding 
coverage by enhancing outreach, such as proactive reg-
istration of potentially poor households, communications 
campaigns and social worker involvement.
Annual growth in credit to the private sector fell from 
67 percent in 2008 to 25 percent in the first quarter 
of 2009, due both to tighter lending standards as well 
as weaker demand.  The authorities have reduced the 
policy rate and attempted to overcome a weakening 
normal channel of transmission of monetary policy by 
purchasing government securities and increasing the 
The TSA, launched in July 2006 after 18 months of intense preparation, has several features worth noting.
•	 The team: The authorities appointed a team of national experts to develop a targeting mechanism, examining experi-
ences in several countries, including Mexico, Chile, and Turkey.
•	 Targeting method: A “proxy means test” (complementing data on income with information of possession of durables, 
quality of the dwelling, education level of the household, and so on) was selected because of the high informality of the 
Georgian economy. The test was then finetuned through additional surveys. The formula accommodates differences in 
consumption across geographical locations. It combines both objective (measurable) variables and subjective assess-
ment of the household situation by social workers.
•	 Administrative arrangements: The application process has two stages. First, households register and give their con-
sent to further collection of information. The blank registration forms can be obtained at many points across Georgia. 
In the second phase, the Social Service Agency visits the household to collect the additional information. The data are 
entered in the database and locked for changes. Further processing is done centrally, including information verification 
and cross-checks, as well the assignment of the proxy score. The entire process is automated to assure objectivity 
and minimize the risk of bribery.
•	 Informing households: Each “scored” household is issued a card with the case number and score, allowing house-
holds to find out immediately whether they qualify for assistance.
•	 Program flexibility: The program is open-ended. Households can apply—at any time—if their score is below the 
cut-off point they automatically become included in the program. This poses a challenge for forecasting the required 
resources and calls for budgetary flexibility.
Source: Mitra, Selowsky and Zalduendo (2009) 



















































































maturity of repo operations to provide dram liquidity to 
the banking system.  However this has raised liquid-
ity in the banking system rather than leading to credit 
growth and bank lending rates remain high. Liquidity has 
more recently been mopped up to prevent short-term 
interbank rates from falling below the policy rate and 
limiting speculation in the foreign exchange market.  The 
banking sector is also part of the anti-crisis program, on-
lending donor funds to small and medium enterprises.  
Furthermore, the central bank has provided funding for a 
mixed public-private National Mortgage Fund designed 
to on-lend to the mortgage market.  
In addition to providing liquidity to the banks, the 
authorities have strengthened the Deposit Insurance 
Fund to boost confidence.  The banking sector has 
seen deterioration in the quality of assets, with non-
performing loans as a proportion of loans rising and 
expected to rise further and increased loan-loss provi-
sions in part due to the negative balance sheet effects of 
the dram devaluation17.   However the banking system 
has a capital adequacy ratio of close to 30 percent.  
Steps are underway to strengthen bank regulation and 
supervision.  For example, consideration is being given 
to limiting banks’ net open foreign exchange positions 
which will require careful monitoring if it is not to be 
circumvented as Armenia integrates into international 
financial markets.
Georgia
Georgia was hit by the global economic crisis in the 
wake of its August 2008 conflict with the Russian 
Federation at a time when ebbing confidence had 
caused Georgian banks to lose access to capital mar-
kets and the country’s fiscal and balance of payments 
needs had increased as well.  The effects of the global 
downturn were felt through a contraction in workers’ 
remittances, which had shrunk by around 20 percent 
year-on-year in the first half of 2009 and falling export 
demand.  Foreign direct investment, which had played 
17  NPLs have stabilized according to the central bank’s definition, since the 
latter includes loans in the “watch” category, but are rising according to the IMF definition 
as more loans move to the “loss” category.
an important role in Georgia in recent years, is estimated 
to have fallen by 70 percent during the same period and 
there was a net outflow of non-FDI capital.  The lari was 
devalued by about 16 percent in November 2008.  The 
combination of restricted availability of external capital 
and sluggish export demand led to imports falling by 
over 25 percent year-on-year in the second quarter of 
2009 compared to a year earlier.  GDP is expected to 
contract by 4 percent in 2009 after having grown by an 
estimated 2 percent in 2008.
Losses in tax revenue due to a sharper-than-
expected recession, but also in part to cuts in tax rates, 
have exerted considerable pressure on public finances 
despite strict control over expenditures.  However, the 
authorities have chosen to support demand and avoid 
a deeper downturn by maintaining expenditures in 2009 
and postponing the fiscal consolidation necessary to 
restore debt sustainability to 2010, when the economy 
is expected to recover.  Overall spending was contained 
by reallocating resources to social and capital spending 
from other less urgent needs, such as defense spend-
ing, which was reduced by 3.5 percentage points of 
GDP.  The overall fiscal deficit in 2009 is 9.4 percent –an 
increase of 3 percentage points from its level in 2008.  
The fiscal consolidation in 2010 is expected to include 
substantial real reductions in administrative costs across 
the board, with only a few exceptions, cuts in subsidies 
to semi-public institutions, capping the wage bill in real 
terms, reduction in cofinancing of investment projects 
and cuts to the investment budget in connection with the 
winding down of large infrastructure projects.  Beyond 
2010, consolidation will continue to focus on expendi-
ture, with revenue measures introduced, if necessary, 
by broadening the tax base and further reductions in 
income tax rates when possible.  Furthermore, the 
institutional reform of budget preparation, execution and 
audit is also underway.  
Georgia faces a bunching of external debt service 
payments in 2013-14 due to the maturing of a $500 mil-
lion Eurobond and repayments to the IMF.  The public 


















































































in 2011 and. with fiscal consolidation starting in 2010, 
decline gradually to 41 percent by 2014.  With much 
of the debt accumulated since 2003 being private, 
public debt had fallen to 22 percent of GDP by 2007.  
However official loans and grants made available at the 
October 2008 donors’ conference in the aftermath of 
the conflict with Russia were used to meet growing fiscal 
and balance of payments needs as well as repayment 
obligations of banks which had lost access to capital 
markets.  This has implied a substantial increase in 
public debt in 2009, which will continue for the next two 
years as official financing from the IMF, the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank, as well as bilateral 
donors, makes possible an accommodative fiscal policy 
in 2009, with fiscal consolidation starting in 2010.  While 
the public debt dynamics is manageable with Georgia’s 
track record of policy implementation, it would become 
more challenging if the recovery from the global eco-
nomic recession were to be weak and remain so for a 
considerable period of time, as is not unusual for reces-
sions that are associated with financial crises.  It would 
also become more difficult if issues of confidence were 
to delay the restoration of access to international capital 
markets and complicate the rollover of the Eurobond.  
More concessional financing would allow the tradeoff 
between fiscal accommodation and debt sustainability 
to be alleviated. Generous donor financing has allowed 
Georgia to run a current account deficit of 15.1 percent 
of GDP in 2009.
Although the recession has the potential to exact 
a high social toll, Georgia has in place a means-tested 
program—the Targeted Social Assistance Program—
that ensures around two-thirds of its benefits reach the 
poorest quintile of households—a targeting accuracy 
on par with OECD countries—while transferring benefits 
that account for nearly a half of the recipient household’s 
posttransfer consumption.  It accounts for over half of 
Georgia’s spending on social assistance, where the 
latter equals around 1 percent of GDP.  The program 
was introduced in 2006 after careful preparation (Box 
1).  However the program, which has many desirable 
properties, covers just over 20 percent of the poorest 
quintile of households, and could be expanded by 
enhancing outreach, such as proactive registration of 
potentially poor households, communications cam-
paigns and social worker involvement.  Furthermore, 
as noted, public social spending—health, pensions, 
social assistance and assistance to internally displaced 
persons from the 1990 and 2008 wars—has been 
increased as part of the fiscal response to the crisis.  
Private sector credit expanded in real terms at an 
annual rate of nearly 50 percent between 2005 and 
2008.  It was underwritten by bank borrowing from 
abroad and is reflected in part in a loan-to-deposit ratio 
of over 200 percent in 2008.  However, the crisis has 
seen a sharp fall in bank lending due to both supply and 
demand factors.  The main constraint on the resumption 
of credit is banks’ reluctance to take on credit risk and 
the need to shrink balance sheets in order to bring about 
more prudent loan-to-deposit ratios, a task that is made 
more difficult by a deposit squeeze due to a drawdown 
of financial savings by households and enterprises.  
Repeated lowering of the policy rate and liquidity injec-
tions have had little impact.  Banks have preferred to 
remain liquid and real lending rates reached levels as 
high as 20 percent before more recent declines.  With 
deposit dollarization around 75 percent which, however 
has stabilized with the lessening of pressure on the 
exchange rate, commercial banks rely heavily on foreign 
currency funding.  Since normal channels of transmis-
sion of monetary policy have been rendered ineffective, 
the central bank has engaged in swaps to allow banks 
that have access to foreign exchange liquidity to finance 
lari loans to borrowers who cannot hedge the currency 
risk of dollar borrowing. Loan dollarization in Georgia is 
estimated to be 75 percent.
Non-performing loans (using a national definition) 
and loan loss provisions have both been rising, a 
process that could continue since asset quality could 
deteriorate further in the event of a more prolonged 
recession than expected.  There have been capital and 

















































































supervision is being strengthened as the authorities 
move towards consolidated and risk-based supervision.  
The overwhelming bulk of the banking sector’s assets 
are foreign-owned and memoranda of understanding 
have been signed with home country supervisors to 
clarify the role of cross-border banks in a financial crisis.  
A financial stability plan has been developed to deal with 
situations of financial stress.  However, the introduction 
of deposit insurance to boost confidence is not being 
considered at this time. 
Mongolia
Fed by a sustained run up in copper and gold prices, 
Mongolia enjoyed a classic commodity boom which 
saw cuts in taxes and social security contributions, 
generous increases in civil service wages and a dramatic 
expansion of untargeted social transfers, resulting in a 
deterioration of the nonmineral fiscal balance amount-
ing to some 10 percent of GDP.  Private sector credit 
expanded rapidly and outran the growth of deposits in 
the banking system.  Inflation reached nearly 30 percent.   
A plunge of 60 percent in copper prices between its 
peak in mid-2008 and January 2009, together with a 
slowdown in world trade on account of the global eco-
nomic recession, brought this to a halt.  A precipitous fall 
in export earnings and limitations on available external 
financing led to a sharp squeeze in imports.  The erosion 
of confidence associated with the crisis saw outflows 
from the banking system and depletion of foreign 
reserves.  After several years of growth rates in the high 
single digits, the economy slowed more than expected 
and GDP is estimated to have grown by 0.5 percent in 
2009.  The current account deficit, which had widened 
to 13.1 percent of GDP in 2008, fell to an estimated 
6.9 percent of GDP in 2009.  After initial unsuccessful 
attempts at maintaining a peg, the currency was allowed 
to depreciate by 40 percent against the US dollar 
between November 2008 and March 2009.  While this 
helped reverse its inflation-induced appreciation since 
2007, it had a negative impact on the balance sheet of 
banks.
Key to the restoration of a sustainable nonmineral 
fiscal balance has been spending restraint which has 
emphasized a wage and hiring freeze and cuts in capital 
expenditures.  However, since the economy weakened 
more than expected, there has some fiscal relaxation 
compared to original plans in 2009, with the fiscal deficit 
target increased by 0.5 percent of GDP in order to 
support demand to the economy, with the intention of 
tightening by 0.5 percent of GDP more than had been 
envisaged from 2010, when the economy is expected 
to recover.  But notwithstanding timely support from the 
IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and 
Japan, the extent of loosening has constrained both by 
the availability of financing and excessive pro-cyclicality 
of fiscal policy during the boom years.  The overall fiscal 
deficit (excluding the estimated fiscal cost of bank reso-
lution of around 3 percentage of GDP) is estimated to 
be 6.5 percent in 2009, which includes an improvement 
in the nonmineral balance of nearly 3 percent of GDP 
compared to 2008. 
With more than one-third of the population living 
below the poverty line, the authorities have taken the 
opportunity of the crisis to undertake a comprehensive 
reform of social transfers, which include consolidation in 
the number of social benefits from over 60 to less than 
20, a reduction in untargeted universal transfers and the 
introduction of a new benefit for those in poverty.  These 
steps are expected to make social transfers more pro-
poor while bringing about fiscal savings.
Monetary policy had been tightened to contain infla-
tion, which had been running at 23 percent in 2008, and 
stem capital outflows.  With the easing of food and fuel 
price increases and the onset of the world recession, 
inflation is expected to have fallen to 8.5 percent.  This, 
together with the restoration of confidence brought 
about by improvements in the deposit guarantee sys-
tem, was reflected in deposits flowing back onshore into 
the banking system, and allowed the central bank room 
for some cuts in the policy rate.  The normal channels 
of transmission of monetary policy have however been 


















































































banks’ willingness to lend and the slowing economy 
has dampened the demand for credit.  Asset quality 
continues to worsen.  Loan dollarization of around one-
third in a situation where there has been a large currency 
depreciation could make it difficult for borrowers without 
effective hedges to service their debt.  The three largest 
banks, which account for 60 percent of the market, 
exceed the minimum capital adequacy ratio (12 percent).   
Banks that do not satisfy these requirements have sub-
mitted recapitalization plans to the financial supervision 
authorities. 
The collapse of the boom has uncovered weak-
nesses in bank regulation and supervision.  The authori-
ties have sought to contain an incipient banking crisis 
by developing deposit guarantees, while seeking to 
limit its potential for abuse and strengthening the legal 
framework for bank resolution.  The fourth-largest bank 
experienced a deposit run in October 2008 and was 
taken over by the authorities.  Fixing the financial system 
is a high priority and the authorities are taking steps to 
strengthen on-site enforcement, introduce legal protec-
tion for supervisors, strengthen fit and proper review 
process for new shareholders.  Progress also needs to 
be made with bank restructuring so that credit to the pri-
vate sector, which has been declining year-on-year dur-
ing 2009 can revive as the economy begins to recover.
A potentially important structural reform is the 
planned adoption of a Fiscal Responsibility Law and an 
organic budget law.  These are intended to ensure that 
a higher proportion of copper revenue is saved, hence 
limiting procyclicality in fiscal policy and strengthen-
ing the institutions of budget management.  Effective 
management of revenue from the massive Oyu Tolgoi 
mining project, one of the world’s largest copper mining 
projects, the development of which is currently under 
negotiation, will require that such institutions are in place 
before the export earnings and fiscal revenue from the 
project come on stream.
Tajikistan 
With a remittances-to-GDP ratio of 47 percent in 2008 
Tajikistan, which has an estimated 1 million migrant 
workers abroad, is one of most remittance-dependent 
countries in the world.  It was strongly affected by the 
economic downturn in Russia, in particular the slow-
down in that country’s construction sector and remit-
tances during the first half of 2009 are estimated to have 
fallen by 30 percent year-in-year.  Exports have been 
another channel of transmission, as the demand for 
Tajikistan’s principal exports, viz., aluminum and cotton, 
weakened as well.  Both developments, together with 
the ruble depreciation, put pressure on the exchange 
rate and the somoni, which is virtually pegged to the 
dollar, was allowed to depreciate by nearly 30 percent 
in 2009.  The IMF estimates that the currency deprecia-
tion in Tajikistan has caused the somoni to depreciate 
the most against the US dollar and the least against 
the Russian ruble among countries in the region.  GDP 
growth, which had averaged between 7 and 8 percent 
in the three preceding years and had been driven by the 
remittance-driven service and construction sectors, as 
well as non-cotton crops and livestock, is expected to 
slow to 2 percent in 2009.
By maintaining the share of expenditures in GDP, 
fiscal policy accommodated a sharp decline in tax reve-
nue, which was caused in part by the VAT being affected 
by a collapse in imports, but also by the domestic 
recession induced by the fall in remittances and exports.   
Furthermore, the VAT rate was cut by 2 percentage 
points and the corporate income tax was reduced for 
certain industries from July 1 as part of an anti-crisis 
plan.  This led to the overall fiscal balance (excluding 
the externally-financed public investment program and 
grants) to move into deficit in 2009 after three years of 
surpluses.  Furthermore, expenditures were reallocated 
towards boosting social spending, strengthening social 
safety nets and easing key infrastructure bottlenecks.  
A virtual fund has been set up within the State budget 
to ensure that expenditures on basic services such as 

















































































from cuts.  Concessional assistance from the IMF, the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and bilateral 
donors has helped Tajikistan run an accommodative 
fiscal policy but a tightening will be necessary in 2010. 
China is financing about 30 percent of public investment 
in 2009.  The current account deficit is estimated to 
be 13.7 percent of GDP in 2009—nearly 6 percentage 
points of GDP higher than in 2008.
Public debt, which had fallen to 30 percent of GDP in 
2008, is on an increasing path in 2009 and 2010, plac-
ing Tajikistan at high risk of debt distress.  Furthermore, 
the global economic recession hit Tajikistan while it 
was dealing with longer standing problems such as 
the resolution of its cotton sector debt and governance 
issues.  A complete write off of cotton farmers’ debt 
would require recapitalization of the central bank, putting 
further pressure on Tajikistan’s public debt dynamics.  
However, the authorities have introduced an external 
The inflow of remittances to Tajikistan in 2008 amounted to 48 percent of the country’s GDP, the highest share worldwide. 
The Russian Federation is the principal country of origin for such remittances, accounting for about 80 to 90 percent of 
officially recorded remittances. 
The box table shows that low-income households in Tajikistan rely heavily on migrant flows. Almost half of the families in the 
bottom quintile in the income distribution have an absent migrant abroad. The difference is very sharp relative to the other 
quintiles. The income dependency seems to be critical for low-income rural households. In the bottom quintile, remittances 
account for almost 80 percent of rural household consumption in cases where they have a migrant abroad.
Although estimates of the magnitude of the decline in remittances during the crisis vary, a range of a 30–35 percent decline 
is commonly used. A 30 percent decline will result in a 25 percent decline in the consumption of the poorest rural house-
holds and an 18 percent decline for the poorest urban households and increase headcount poverty in Tajikistan from 53 to 
58 percent.
Box Table 1. Share of households with migrants, by preremittance consumption quintile
Source: Mitra, Selowsky and Zalduendo (2009) 




















































































debt ceiling of 40 percent of GDP, which should keep 
public debt at sustainable levels.  The country would 
benefit from more grant financing.
The decline in remittances will have a strong adverse 
impact on the poor in what is the poorest country in the 
region.  The table shows that low-income households 
in Tajikistan rely heavily on migrant flows.  Almost half of 
the families in the bottom quintile of the income distribu-
tion have an absent migrant abroad.  The difference is 
very sharp relative to the other quintiles.  The income 
dependency seems to be critical for low-income rural 
households.  In the bottom quintile, remittances account 
for almost 80 percent of rural household consumption in 
cases where they have a migrant abroad.  A 30 percent 
decline in remittances during the crisis will result in a 25 
percent decline in the consumption of the poorest rural 
households and an 18 percent decline for the poorest 
urban households and increase headcount poverty in 
Tajikistan from 53 to 58 percent (Box 2).
However Tajikistan, which spends roughly 0.5 
percent of GDP on social assistance, has yet to develop 
a means-tested safety net program that has high target-
ing accuracy and reasonable coverage of the poorest 
households.  It is important that the opportunity of the 
crisis be taken to develop a new well-targeted program.  
Some programs to consider are (i) direct cash transfers, 
which have low administrative costs and do not distort 
prices; (ii) conditional cash transfers, which have addi-
tional administrative requirements compared with direct 
(unconditional) cash transfers since they also require 
some sort of monitoring of education or health condi-
tionalities or both; and (iii) public works schemes, such 
as workfare and cash-for-work, which could be par-
ticularly attractive when faced with an influx of returning 
migrant workers; these can have lower net costs than 
direct transfer programs, since they can improve key 
infrastructure.  It takes 12—18 months—and longer for 
countries with limited institutional capacity—to develop 
basic targeting, registry and safety net systems.  
Banks are experiencing shortages of liquidity in 
both somoni and dollars.  Channels of transmission of 
monetary policy have limited effectiveness in Tajikistan, 
even in normal times, since the domestic interbank mar-
ket is not well developed.  Attempts to ease monetary 
policy through reductions in the central bank’s refinanc-
ing rate have not eased liquidity shortages.  Credit 
growth has slowed and lending rates have gone up 
despite a lower refinancing rate.  Banks are vulnerable: 
they have seen deterioration in their asset quality, which 
is reflected in rising non-performing loans. in part due to 
the slowdown in economic activity but also the deprecia-
tion of the somoni in an environment of loan dollarization, 
estimated at nearly 60 percent, where not all borrowers 
have effective hedges18.   A further worsening of banks’ 
portfolios would occur should external adjustment call 
for additional depreciation.  On the liability side, the 
somoni deposit base is vulnerable to erosion due to 
uncertainty.  Over the medium-term Tajikistan faces an 
agenda of modernizing banking sector institutions.
B.  The Financially Integrated
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan, which is financially the deepest and most 
integrated among the economies considered here, 
experienced two sets of external shocks: first, a sudden 
stop in external capital flows in August 2007, precipi-
tating a capital account crisis and leading to a sharp 
slowdown in growth in 2008, and second, a collapse in 
its external terms of trade as oil prices fell rapidly in the 
latter part of 2008 from a high of nearly $150/bbl to $40/
bbl as the global economic recession took hold.  Both 
would exert pressure on the currency.  During the first 
episode, as capital flows reversed, the National Bank of 
Kazakhstan used 25 percent of its reserves to defend 
the currency, both to maintain depositor confidence and 
limit risks to corporate balance sheets and then pegged 
the tenge to the dollar.  The second episode was to lead 
to a devaluation of the tenge by 20 percent in February 
2009, since the rapid fall in oil prices also coincided with 


















































































a substantial depreciation of the Russian ruble.  The 
devaluation of the tenge broadly restored the real effec-
tive exchange rate to its level prior to the ruble devalu-
ation and the rate is now supported by the recovery in 
oil prices and external financing for the energy sector.  
The current account deficit is expected to be around 
2 percent of GDP in 2009.  However, the combination 
of reduced external capital flows, lower earnings from 
oil exports and restrained demand for Kazakhstan’s 
exports due to the global recession in importing 
countries contributed to a squeeze in imports.  Growth 
slowed sharply from the high single digits attained since 
the turn of the century to just over 3 percent in 2008 as 
construction activity decelerated and industrial produc-
tion fell.  The economy is expected to contract by 2 
percent in 2009.  
Much of the policy response has been focused on 
resolving problems in the banking sector precipitated 
by the capital account crisis and using fiscal and other 
policies to provide stimulus to the economy in the face 
of the recession.  As with other countries in the former 
Soviet Union that had undergone deep and protracted 
transition recessions, real private sector credit had 
grown very rapidly since the turn of the century: at 43 
percent per annum during 2000—2004 and 36 percent 
per annum during 2005—2008.  A substantial proportion 
of that growth was financed by borrowing by commer-
cial banks from abroad, mostly in wholesale markets, 
reflected in the loan-to-deposit ratio reaching 200 per-
cent in 2007.  Moreover, half of all lending was in foreign 
currency.  Although households benefited from the 
expansion in credit—their share in lending to the private 
sector, starting from a low base, grew to 30 percent by 
2008—much of the lending was to corporates and was 
primarily directed to the nontradables sector.  The crisis 
was precipitated by the drying up of external wholesale 
funding, typically the most volatile funding source for 
banks, compared to deposits and parent bank funding.  
Banks owe nearly 40 percent of GDP in external liabili-
ties, a quarter of which matured in 2009.  Of the four 
banks which together account for 70 percent of banking 
sector assets two, together with a third smaller bank, 
had stopped making payments on principal.   
Containing the banking crisis has taken the form of 
lowering policy rates and the provision of liquidity sup-
port from the central bank through easing of reserve 
requirements, repurchase agreements and foreign 
exchange swaps, the active placement of bank deposits 
by companies under the umbrella of Samruk-Kazyna 
(formed from the merger of the state holding company 
and the sustainable development fund) and recapital-
izing the Deposit Insurance Fund by increasing the size 
of retail deposits guaranteed sevenfold to boost deposi-
tors’ confidence.  The bank resolution framework was 
strengthened and has been used to intervene in dis-
tressed banks, including the largest bank in Kazakhstan.   
Resolution of the banking crisis has involved 
Samruk-Kazyna’s injecting capital into the top three 
banks, in the course of which it has taken a controlling 
share in the largest bank.  Agreement involving burden-
sharing with creditors has recently been reached on 
restructuring of both banks that had been in default, with 
approval of all creditors pending in one case.  However, 
the sharp squeeze in credit growth caused by delever-
aging by banks in response to the funding squeeze and 
deteriorating asset quality, which is reflected in rising 
nonperforming loans and loan loss provisions, can only 
be reversed once processes to restructure corporate 
and household debt are set in motion.  Efforts are being 
made to restructure foreign currency mortgages and 
loans to small and medium enterprises into local cur-
rency.  While the authorities can facilitate negotiations 
between creditors and debtors, there is no reason to 
commit public resources to restructure private sector 
debt.  Household debt in Kazakhstan represents just 
under 20 percent of GDP and an estimated 40 percent 
of it is denominated in foreign currency.  The share of 
indebted households is higher in the upper income 
quintiles and debt service as a share of income generally 
decreases with income.  
Fiscal policy has been accommodative as the 


















































































expenditure in the face of a collapse in non-oil revenue.  
In order to stimulate the economy, the authorities have 
introduced a $10 billion anti-crisis plan, with Samruk-
Kazyna playing a prominent role in its implementation.  
Key elements of the plan include (1) public support to the 
four top banks, (2) completion of unfinished residential 
construction projects and refinancing mortgages at 
lower interest rates, (3) financial assistance to small and 
medium enterprises through the banking sector through 
refinancing existing loans at lower interest rates and 
providing new credit and the agriculture sector and (4) 
increased public investment in the industrial sector.  The 
overall fiscal balance in 2009 will be in deficit for the 
first time in nearly a decade, in an amount expected to 
be 2.1 percent of GDP and will be financed by the Oil 
Fund (NBRK).  Spending under the anti-crisis program, 
together with improving external conditions, including 
bilateral financing from China of up to $5 billion com-
pared to gross external financing needs of $16.5 billion in 
2009, as well as rising oil prices, which stood at around 
$72/bbl in early December 2009, should contribute to 
growth in Kazakhstan turning positive in 2010.  
The social consequences of the crisis, which are 
manifested in part through increases in open as well 
as hidden unemployment, are sought to be addressed 
through emphasis on job creation under the “Strategic 
Employment Program” by providing financial support to 
small and medium enterprises and the agriculture sec-
tor.  However targeted social safety nets could benefit 
from strengthening.  Although around 70 percent of the 
benefits of means-tested Targeted Social Assistance 
program reach the poorest quintile of households, 
indeed much more than is the case for well-targeted 
programs in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, coverage 
of the poorest quintile is less than 5 percent and the pro-
gram accounts for a negligible proportion of total safety 
net spending in Kazakhstan.  Improving coverage and 
increasing the benefits transferred by the program would 
direct more assistance to individuals rather than through 
support for sectors, which is the focus of the anti-crisis 
program. 
There is a substantial agenda in strengthening bank 
regulation and supervision in the direction of raising 
bank capital requirements, limiting banks’ borrowing in 
foreign wholesale markets through higher provisioning 
requirements on loans to unhedged borrowers, improv-
ing corporate governance in the banking sector and 
upgrading supervision.  Given the demonstrated volatility 
of external wholesale funding in the present crisis, the 
growth of the banking system should be based mainly 
on domestic deposits, with steps being taken towards 
the medium-term objective of financial markets in tenge 
debt.
C.   Energy Exporters
Azerbaijan
The relatively modest size of its financial sector and 
its limited integration into world financial markets has 
implied that the global economic crisis was transmitted 
to Azerbaijan through the trade and remittance chan-
nels.  Given its undiversified economic structure, around 
95 percent of Azerbaijan’s merchandise exports are 
accounted for by oil and the fall in its price in the latter 
half of 2008 affected export earnings.  Remittances, 
which equaled 3 percent of GDP in 2008, and over half 
of which originated in Russia, fell sharply as well.  These 
shocks occurred at a time when public spending which, 
as a share of non-oil GDP, had risen from 37 percent in 
2004 to over 80 percent in 2008, began to slowdown 
toward more sustainable rates.  The boom in public 
spending, which was the result of a strategy of using 
oil revenue to create a high-productivity economy at 
the cost, if necessary, of temporarily high inflation and 
loss of external competitiveness, had fueled a massive 
expansion in sectors such as construction, services 
and agriculture and non-oil GDP grew at an average of 
around 11 percent between 2004 and 2007.  Growth 
rates, which had reached a peak of 30 percent in 2006, 
falling back to 23 percent in 2007 and nearly 12 percent 
in 2008, declined to an estimated 7.5 percent in 2009.  

















































































and foreign exchange position.  Despite a non-oil 
deficit estimated at almost 60 percent of nonoil GDP in 
2008, the overall fiscal surplus was nearly 30 percent 
of GDP in 2008.  International reserves and Oil Fund 
assets amounted to $18 billion in 2008, which may be 
compared to a figure $2 billion of external debt owed by 
Azeri commercial banks in 2008.  Faced with accelerat-
ing inflation from food and other commodity prices till 
2008 and extremely high credit growth due to a policy 
of a managed float against the dollar, the central bank 
had tightened liquidity. It had introduced a number of 
prudential measures, such as reserve requirements on 
foreign borrowing, tighter asset classification standards, 
higher provisioning requirements for non-performing 
loans, restrictions on the use of subordinated debt in 
meeting capital adequacy requirements, increased risk 
weights for mortgage loans and more stringent criteria 
for collateralized loans.  The central bank reviewed 
banks’ risk management systems and pushed them to 
reduce credit growth targets.  Hence banks were gener-
ally in a solid position when the crisis struck.  
However, when the global economic crisis caused 
foreign banks to refuse rolling over maturing external 
debt of Azeri banks, the central bank reversed course, 
reducing reserve requirements and making liquidity 
available to banks that were deemed solvent but in 
temporary difficulty.  Policy rates were cut, a move 
facilitated by inflation falling from 20 percent in 2008 to 2 
percent in 2009 due in part to a decline in international 
food and commodity prices.  These measures were 
effective in dealing with the containment phase of bank 
distress.  But they did not succeed in affecting banks’ 
lending rates.  This was because the extraordinarily 
rapid growth of private sector credit—nearly 40 percent 
annually in real terms during 2005—2008—in a situation 
of limited risk management capacity in banks implied 
that the slowdown in the economy has led inevitably to 
deteriorating asset quality, increased provisioning and 
lower credit growth.  Indeed, banks have considerable 
exposure to property as a result of substantial lending 
to the construction sector, the growth of which slowed 
sharply in the second half of 2009, and the use of prop-
erty as collateral for other loans.  
While the authorities had sought to introduce flex-
ibility in the exchange rate by using a two-currency 
basket regime comprising euros and dollars to peg 
the manat, a change to which market participants had 
begun to adapt, the volatility between the two basket 
currencies during the crisis caused it to be suspended, 
amid concerns that the large depreciation against the 
dollar implied by the arrangement could lead to a loss of 
confidence and encourage re-dollarization.  Azerbaijan 
continues to maintain its dollar peg.  
As unemployment rises in the wake of the slow-
down, policy attention will focus on social safety nets.  
Azerbaijan spends around 1 percent of GDP on social 
assistance.  It has at least one means-tested program—
the Targeted Social Assistance Program—that is quite 
effective in basing eligibility on income testing and home 
visits and delivers around 55 percent of its benefits to 
the poorest quintile of households.  Coverage—the 
share of the poorest quintile of households covered by 
the program—is however a modest 15 percent.  Hence 
the country is well-positioned to scale up its means-
tested programs by raising benefits and expanding 
coverage by enhancing outreach, such as proactive 
registration of potentially poor households, communica-
tions campaigns and social worker involvement, in order 
to cushion the poor from the effects of the crisis.
The principal structural challenge facing Azerbaijan 
is one of diversification.  However, non-oil trade relative 
to non-oil GDP has been declining since 2006.  At the 
same time, non-oil private investment and non-oil foreign 
direct investment relative to non-oil GDP have been 
falling.  The share of non-tradables in non-oil GDP has 
been rising, suggesting that diversification may have 
stalled.  The crisis could provide an opportunity to rec-
alibrate policy towards lower spending from oil revenue 
to mitigate its crowding out effects and devote renewed 
attention to improving the business environment to 



















































































With a banking sector predominantly under state owner-
ship and not integrated into global finance, Uzbekistan 
was not directly affected by the crisis that erupted in 
advanced country financial markets.  Instead the impact 
was to occur first, through a shrinking of markets in the 
Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, which are among 
its top three export destinations owing to capital account 
crises in both countries and exports of goods and 
services are expected to decline by around 17 percent in 
2009.  Second, given that commodities account for 80 
percent of merchandise exports, Uzbekistan has been 
hit by declining commodity prices.  However, the latter 
channel was somewhat less important: while exports 
of cotton, chemicals and automobiles fell sharply dur-
ing the first half of 2009, export revenues from gold 
remained broadly stable, while natural gas revenues 
doubled, reflecting a substantial increase in the price 
agreed between the government and the Russian 
Federation’s Gazprom at which Uzbek gas is bought 
for re-export to Europe.  A third channel of transmis-
sion was remittances, the bulk of which originate in the 
Russian Federation and which accounted for 7 percent 
of GDP in 2008.  These inflows, which play the role of 
a safety net for poor households in rural areas where 
unemployment has become a significant problem since 
the transformation of collective farms, are estimated 
to have fallen by around a half in 2009, potentially 
intensifying a social problem in Uzbekistan.  Faced with 
these shocks and the depreciation of the Russian ruble, 
Uzbekistan devalued the sum by around 15 percent in 
May 2009.
Growth rates of GDP, which had been in the high 
single digits in the preceding three years, have fallen 
in 2009 but, according to preliminary indications, not 
below the 7 percent targeted by the authorities.  The 
reason is a significant stimulus package which the 
authorities adopted in phases in November 2008 and 
January 2009 and which was enabled by the country’s 
strong fiscal and foreign exchange position.  Uzbekistan 
entered the crisis with a strong fiscal position, having run 
a fiscal surplus of 5 percent of GDP in the three preced-
ing years, and accumulated 11 percent of GDP in the 
Fund for Reconstruction and Development (FRD) which 
had been set up in 2006 to ensure intergenerational 
redistribution of commodity revenues and the provi-
sion of insurance in times of crisis.  Foreign exchange 
reserves equaled 40 percent of GDP.  The stimulus 
package includes measures to enhance export capacity, 
support small and medium enterprises, increase social 
spending to counter the effects of decreased labor 
migration and loss of remittances, undertake repair 
and maintenance projects in public health and educa-
tion, and increase public investment and maintenance 
on roads, irrigation and drainage, energy and other 
infrastructure and local rural projects.  The instruments 
to be used include targeted provision of subsidized 
credit, temporary tax reductions and customs tariff 
reductions for inputs into priority production, as well as 
support for switching lands sown to food crops at the 
expense of cotton production, public resources for rural 
infrastructure projects and creation of special economic 
zones.  The measures are intended to support domestic 
demand by promoting public investment directly and 
boost private investment through the provision of credit 
and easing of administrative burdens for small and 
medium enterprises, as well as confirmed commitments 
made by major foreign companies, such as General 
Motors and Gazprom.  Importantly in addition, increases 
in private consumption are expected to flow from a 50 
percent increase in wages, benefits and pensions which, 
together with steps to increase domestic production of 
consumer goods, are part of the stimulus package.  The 
current account balance, which is estimated to have 
reached 12.8 percent of GDP in 2008, is expected to fall 
to less than 5 percent of GDP in 2009.
Uzbekistan spends over 2 percent of GDP on social 
assistance, a figure higher than in the other countries 
in Caucasus and Central Asia for which comparable 
data are available.  However, no measures appear to 
have been adopted to enhance the targeting of social 

















































































of the 2003 Household Budget Survey shows that 25 
percent of the benefits of means-tested social safety 
net programs in Uzbekistan reach the poorest quintile of 
households, while they cover 3 percent of poor house-
holds and transfer nearly 28 percent of the households’ 
post-transfer consumption.  Hence there is considerable 
room to improve targeting and coverage of social safety 
nets even within existing fiscal envelopes by eliminating 
most untargeted privileges, refocusing design and eli-
gibility criteria, developing and applying targeting tools, 
improving implementation arrangements and strength-
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AThe Emerging Markets Forum was created by the Centennial Group as a not-for-pro￿t 
initiative to bring together high-level government and corporate leaders from around the 
world to engage in dialogue on the key economic, ￿nancial and social issues facing 
emerging market countries.
 
The Forum is focused on some 70 emerging market economies in East and South Asia, 
Eurasia, Latin America and Africa that share prospects of superior economic performance, 
already have or seek to create a conducive business environment and are of near-term 
interest to private investors, both domestic and international. Our current list of EMCs is 
shown on the back cover. We expect this list to eveolve over time, as countries’ policies and 
prospects change.      
Further details on the Forum and its meetings may be seen on our website at http://www.emergingmarketsforum.org
The Watergate O￿ce Building, 2600 Virginia Avenue, NW, Suite 201
Washington, DC 20037, USA.  Tel:(1) 202 393 6663  Fax: (1) 202 393 6556
Email: info@emergingmarketsforum.org 
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